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Cockey and Hay

CROSSING JORDAN: HOW A BARTENDING CRISIS REVOLUTIONIZED1
THE LAW OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT
Robin R. Cockey and Laura E. Hay*
INTRODUCTION
Americans work more than the inhabitants of any other
developed country. However, because our legal system is based upon
the common law, the laws that govern our workplace can depend upon
such vagaries as the time it takes to make a cocktail. The case of
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleu Corp. illustrates this surprising but
indisputable proposition.2 According to online mixology accounts, a
“Hula Hula” is comprised of equal parts gin, curacao, and orange
juice.3 Although there appears to be widespread agreement it should
take about thirty seconds to make a Hula Hula, the laws barring
workplace harassment, and the laws protecting workers who complain
about it, changed significantly when a bartender in Ocean City,
Maryland complained that a Hula Hula takes too long to make.
The chain of events set in motion by this bartending crisis
culminated in Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleu Corp., a landmark
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
that made it clear workers could regard even a single incident of
targeted abuse as intolerable, and could complain about it with
impunity.4 Thus, from small beginnings came great consequences for
countless members of the American workforce.
This work sets out to demonstrate the inherently random nature
of the American legal system, in which the right facts must combine
with the right judges on the right day in order to produce progress .
Part I will discuss the factual background of Boyer-Liberto.5 Part II
will give an overview of workplace harassment law in the Fourth
Circuit prior to Boyer-Liberto.6 Parts III and IV will address in detail
the progression of Boyer-Liberto, and how it could easily have been
© 2017 Robin R. Cockey and Laura E. Hay. The authors served as counsel for Ms.
Boyer-Liberto.
1
Perhaps a bit of hubris: The Boyer-Liberto majority felt they were simply following
long-standing Supreme Court precedent, and said so. See Boyer-Liberto v.
Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
2
Id.
3
Hula Hula or Hoola Hoola Cocktail, DIFFORD’S GUIDE,
https://www.diffordsguide.com/cocktails/recipe/2448/hula-hula-or-hoola-hoolacocktail (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
4
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d 264.
5
See infra Part I.
6
See infra Part II.
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resolved under Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,7 the then
controlling case law.8 Part V will offer a critical analysis of the
majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions of Boyer-Liberto,
examining how the majority’s approach is appropriate and why the
dissent erred in its reasoning.9 Lastly, Part VI will explore the future of
workplace harassment law in the Fourth Circuit and how the
unresolved questions created by this case could be addressed moving
forward.10
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF BOYER-LIBERTO V.
FONTAINEBLEU CORP

The night of September 14, 2010, a traveler came into one of
the many bars of the Clarion Hotel in Ocean City, Maryland.11 After
some back-and-forth with the waitress, Reya Boyer-Liberto, about
what drink to order, the traveler decided to try a “Hula Hula,” one of
the specialty cocktails listed in the bar menu.12 Ms. Boyer-Liberto
hurried to fill the order, anxious to avoid causing her customer more
frustration.13
Ms. Boyer-Liberto was experienced in the hospitality business,
but had only worked at the Clarion for one month.14 She had
apparently done well, as she had no disciplinary record, and –
critically – had remained on the staff after the busy summer season
ended on Labor Day.15

458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp.,
786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015).
8
See infra Parts III and IV.
9
See infra Part V.
10
See infra Part VI.
11
The account given here is drawn primarily from the facts presented by BoyerLiberto in defending a Motion for Summary Judgment as recounted by the Fourth
Circuit. 786 F.3d at 269–71. Because the Summary Judgment standard requires the
court to construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, i.e.
Ms. Boyer-Liberto, it is important to remember that the Defendants would no doubt
tell the story rather differently. Id. at 269 n.1.
12
Id. at 269.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 8, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d
264 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-1473).
7
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But this night proved her Waterloo. Her troubles began when
the bartender refused to make the drink, claiming it was too time
consuming.16 Undaunted, Ms. Boyer-Liberto quickly dashed through
the adjoining kitchen to reach another bar manned by a more
compliant bartender, and then, Hula Hula in hand, she made her way
back through the kitchen.17 As she weaved through cooks and
dishwashers, she was accosted by Trudi Clubb, the Food and Beverage
Manager.18 Ms. Clubb had apparently been trying for some time to get
Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s attention, and her first audible barrage was “Hey,
girl that can’t hear.”19 Ms. Clubb berated Ms. Boyer-Liberto for
cutting through the kitchen; she raised her voice and drew so close she
sprayed saliva on Ms. Boyer-Liberto, who could feel Ms. Clubb’s
breath on her face.20 As Ms. Boyer-Liberto walked away, she heard
Ms. Clubb yell, “I am going to get you … I am going to make you
sorry.”21 According to Ms. Boyer-Liberto, Ms. Clubb concluded by
muttering, “Damn [or dang] porch monkey.”22
Ms. Clubb is White, and Ms. Boyer-Liberto African-American.
Unamused by Ms. Clubb’s tirade, Ms. Boyer-Liberto complained to
the Clarion management office the following day.23 She had barely
begun her account to the hotel’s Food and Beverage Director, Richard
Heubeck, when Ms. Clubb burst in and announced, “I need to speak to
you, little girl.”24 When Ms. Boyer-Liberto remonstrated she was
meeting with Mr. Heubeck, Ms. Clubb retorted, “I am more
important,” and led her out of the office to an adjoining table.25 After
the women had seated themselves, Ms. Clubb reprised her lecture of
the night before, castigating Ms. Boyer-Liberto for passing through the
16

See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 269.
Id.
18
See id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270.
22
Id. The record is unclear as to whether Ms. Clubb referred to Ms. Boyer-Liberto as
a “dang porch monkey” or “damn porch monkey.” Id. The slur refers to the negative
stereotype of a lazy African American. See Jonathon Green, Porch, GREEN’S
DICTIONARY OF SLANG, https://greensdictofslang.com/entry/hugtd2y#i4w5tlq (last
visited Nov. 7, 2017). Ms. Clubb denies using the term “porch monkey.” BoyerLiberto, 786 at 270.
23
Boyer-Liberto, 786 at 270.
24
Id.
25
Id.
17
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kitchen and angrily shouting, “I’m gonna get you. I’m gonna go to
[hotel owner] Dr. [Leonard] Berger.”26 According to Ms. BoyerLiberto, as the women stood to leave, Ms. Clubb looked directly at her
and again muttered, “porch monkey.”27
This time, Ms. Boyer-Liberto formally complained to the
Clarion Human Resources Director, Nancy Berghauer.28 A write-up of
her complaint was sent to General Manager Mark Elman, who then
personally met with Ms. Boyer-Liberto. The complaint also found its
way to the desk of Dr. Berger, who directed Mr. Elman to fire Ms.
Boyer-Liberto.29 Mr. Elman, Mr. Heubeck and Ms. Berghauer all met
with Ms. Boyer-Liberto and dismissed her from her position on
September 21, five days after her formal complaint.30 Meanwhile, Ms.
Clubb was issued a written warning, even though she denied having
called Ms. Boyer-Liberto a “porch monkey” on either occasion.31
Unfortunately, Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s run of bad luck was not
over. After lodging a harassment and retaliation complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and then
filing suit,32 she found herself in a head-on collision with an
inauspicious decision entered five years before by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. That case, Jordan v.
Alternative Resources Corp.,33 was commonly viewed as prohibiting
single-incident workplace harassment claims. This view was adopted

26

Id.
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (en
banc).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3–4, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786
F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 13-1473).
31
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270.
32
Ms. Boyer-Liberto asserted claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and
42 U.S.C. §1981. Id. at 271. Her Title VII claims, for workplace harassment and
retaliatory discharge, were asserted against Fontainebleau Corporation, the
corporation that owned the hotel. Id. Her §1981 claim, for retaliatory discharge, was
asserted both against Fontainebleau Corporation and Dr. Berger, as the corporate
owner and the decision maker who directed she be terminated. Id.
33
458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau
Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2015).
27
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by Judge James K. Bredar,34 the District Court Judge who threw Ms.
Boyer-Liberto’s case out on a motion for summary judgment.35
II.

JORDAN V. ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES CORPORATION:
LEGAL PRECEDENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Jordan, like Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s story, makes ugly reading.
The case arose at the height of the D.C. sniper attacks, which
terrorized the Washington metropolitan area for most of October
2002.36 The attacks left ten victims dead and three others critically
wounded.37 Public hysteria was endemic, whipped up by lurid media
coverage.38 Since the snipers attacked public places like gas stations
and parking lots, there were widespread reports of people afraid to
pump gas or even wheel a shopping cart across supermarket parking
lots.39 Finally, on October 23, 2002, it was announced that
Montgomery County police had arrested two suspects, John Allen
Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo.40

34

Judge Bredar recently received attention after he refused to delay implementation
of a consent decree created to address issues within the Baltimore City Police
Department in the wake of the death of Freddie Gray. The Trump administration
sought, unsuccessfully, to put the reforms on hold. See Brendan McDermid, Judge
Approves Baltimore Police Decree Over Sessions Concerns, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 7,
2017, 6:54 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/baltimore-freddie-gray-jeff-sessionspolice-police-brutality-racism-donald-580883.
35
See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. JKB-12-212, 2013 WL 1413031, at
* 4–5 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2013), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
36
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 336.
37
Id. at 337.
38
The exaggerations and outright fabrications of New York Times reporter Jayson
Blair forced the paper’s top editors, Howell Raines and Gerald Boyd, to resign. Dan
Barry, et al., CORRECTING THE RECORD; Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves
Long Trail of Deception, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/correcting-the-record-times-reporter-whoresigned-leaves-long-trail-of-deception.html?mcubz=1; Jacques Steinberg, Executive
Editor of the Times and Top Deputy Step Down, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/05/national/executive-editor-of-the-times-and-topdeputy-step-down.html?mcubz=1.
39
See Jean Marbella, et al., Shootings Recall Deadlier D.C. Sniper Rampage of
2002, BALT. SUN (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bsmd-fort-meade-sniper-20150304-story.html.
40
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g en
banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).
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A group of IBM employees, including Jay Farjah and the
Plaintiff, Robert Jordan, watched the local news on a breakroom
television set.41 To no one in particular, Farjah – who is White –
exclaimed, “They should put those two Black monkeys in a cage with
a bunch of Black apes and let the apes f-k them.”42 Jordan, who is
Black, overheard the comment, found it offensive, and reported it to
his supervisors.43 He was then terminated a little less than a month
later for “being disruptive.”44
Like Boyer-Liberto, Jordan filed suit under Title VII in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. 45 Like Boyer-Liberto,
Jordan asserted a claim for retaliatory discharge, based on Jordan’s
reporting of workplace harassment.46 Unlike Boyer-Liberto, Jordan
asserted no claim for the underlying harassment itself.47 Judge
Deborah Chasanow granted the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ruling
it was not “objectively reasonable” to believe that Farjah’s comment,
which was not directed at Jordan, could suffice to create “an abusive
working environment.”48
Jordan appealed, backed by the EEOC, the Public Justice
Center and the Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers
Association, all of whom filed amicus briefs.49 Given the conservative
complexion of the Fourth Circuit panel assigned to the appeal,50 it
might have gone better for Jordan if his bevy of liberal amici had
supported the opposition.
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id. at 337.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 336.
46
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g en
banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).
47
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 332, 335–36.
48
Id. at 337–38. See Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., No. Civ.A. DKC 20041091, 2005 WL 736610, at *5, *12 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2005) aff’d 485 F.3d 332 (4th
Cir. 2006).
49
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 332, 335–36.
50
Jordan’s case was heard by Judges Emory Widener, Paul Niemeyer, and Robert
King. Id. Judges Widener and Niemeyer, who formed the majority, were both
appointed by Republican presidents. See Judges of the Fourth Circuit Since 1801,
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/docs/pdfs/historyjudges.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
Judge King, a Clinton appointee, dissented. See id.; see also Jordan 457 F.3d at 336.
42
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The Opinion was written by Judge Niemeyer, who perhaps
found in the case much to exemplify the temptations of liberalism.51
Judge Niemeyer’s Opinion seemed to treat Jordan’s debacle as a
cautionary tale: just as Jordan erred in letting his revulsion at “a single
abhorrent slur” precipitate him into making an ill-advised complaint,
so might a well-meaning but misguided judge err in letting the case’s
bad facts lead to the production of bad law.52 Judge Niemeyer avoided
the perceived trap.53
Although Jordan had not asserted a workplace harassment
claim, Judge Niemeyer devoted much of his Opinion to an explanation
of why no workplace harassment claim was available to Jordan.54
Judge Niemeyer emphasized that such claims depended upon
exposition of a workplace “permeated” with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule and insult, an environment in which those
elements were – to use the Supreme Court’s rubric – so “severe or
pervasive” as to create an abusive workplace that virtually altered the
conditions of the employment.55 In assessing the viability of such a
claim, Judge Niemeyer held, the Courts look to “the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is accompanied by
physical threats or humiliation, and whether it unreasonably interferes
with the plaintiff’s work performance.”56 Applying these factors,
Judge Niemeyer reasoned that the single incident of invective
overheard by Jordan could not possibly be said to have transformed
Jordan’s workplace into the toxic environment proscribed by
prevailing harassment jurisprudence.57 Then Judge Niemeyer made a
bit of a leap: Since no workplace harassment claim was available to
Jordan, then Judge Chasanow was right in holding that it was not even
Judge Niemeyer’s Opinion could easily have been written by his father,
distinguished conservative political theorist Gerhart Niemeyer, who felt that
“[l]iberalism is essentially sentimental benevolence. Liberals are in love with their
own feelings rather than the reality at which their benevolence is aiming. If
Conservatives find liberals repugnant for this reason it must be that they affirm life’s
reality rather than their own emotions.” Gerhart Niemeyer, Russell Kirk & Ideology,
30 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 35, 35–36. (1994).
52
See Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341.
53
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g en
banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).
54
Id. at 342–43.
55
Id. at 339–40.
56
Id. at 339 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 774, 787–88 (1998)).
57
Id. at 340.
51
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“objectively reasonable” for Jordan to believe that he might have such
a claim.58 That leap got Judge Niemeyer to the end of his syllogism.59
Jordan had made no objectively reasonable complaint, his complaint
was therefore unprotected,60 and Jordan was at the mercy of
Maryland’s at-will employment doctrine. Unsurprisingly, Judge
Widener joined with Judge Niemeyer.61
There was, however, an eloquent dissent by Judge King.62
Judge King emphasized that, from the beginning, the notion of
affording protection to workplace whistleblowers had been calculated
to enable employers to act upon early warnings of workplace
shenanigans before they ripened into actionable misconduct.63 Judge
King pointed out that the courts had not only encouraged early,
preventive reporting of evolving misconduct, but had also dismissed
the claims of plaintiffs who put off complaining.64 Accurately, Judge
King characterized Jordan’s plight as a “Catch-22:”65 If Jordan
complained before full-blown workplace harassment had developed,
he could be fired with impunity; but if Jordan put off complaining
until the workplace environment had actually become “permeated”
with harassment, his procrastination would result in the dismissal of
his claims.66 Jordan’s counsel, Washington lawyer Stephen Chertkof,

58

See Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341.
Id. at 340–41
60
Id.
61
Id. at 336. A Nixon appointee, Judge Widener was widely regarded as a senior
statesman among the Court’s conservatives. H. Emory Widener Jr.; Longtime Judge
on U.S. Appeals Court, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2007)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/20/AR2007092002531.html.
62
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 349–59.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 54–57.
65
Id. at 349. The original “Catch-22” was the centerpiece of Joseph Heller’s 1961
novel of the same name. In the novel, which dramatized the plight of World War II
bomber crews, the crewmen found themselves in a Jordan-esque dilemma: if the
rigors of combat made them crazy, they need only report this to the medical officer,
and they would be sent home. However, if anyone reported to the medical officer
that he found combat unendurable, he was obviously saner than his crewmates and
had no grounds for being sent home. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Simon & Schuster
2011) (1961).
66
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 355.
59
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petitioned for en banc review and almost got it.67 Under the Federal
Rules, an en banc petition will be granted if supported by the votes of
a majority of the active, sitting judges.68 Chertkof fell one vote short,
rehearing was denied,69 and Jordan became the bête noir of Fourth
Circuit workplace harassment law.
III.

THE BOYER-LIBERTO CASE IN THE LOWER COURT

A. The District Court Case
In applying Jordan to the Boyer-Liberto case, Judge Bredar
could easily have distinguished Jordan. For starters, Boyer-Liberto
wasn’t truly a “single incident” case at all. Ms. Boyer-Liberto had
been called the same racial epithet not once but twice, and it is
sophistry to rely on the fact they “arose” from a single incident, since
that would lead to manifest absurdity.70 Imagine, for example, Ms.
Clubb continuing to call Ms. Boyer-Liberto a “porch monkey” every
day for a year, conduct which even Judge Niemeyer would probably
agree “permeated” the workplace, and would not be merely a “single
incident” harassment. Additionally, Jordan had not been the target of
the offensive language, but had merely overheard it,71 whereas BoyerLiberto was directly targeted.72 In Jordan, the racist invective was
unaccompanied by any threats against the plaintiff;73 in Boyer-Liberto,
it was accompanied by threats which unmistakably put the plaintiff’s
job on the line.74 In Jordan, there was nothing violent or physical
about the offensive outburst;75 in Boyer-Liberto, the perpetrator
literally “got up in plaintiff’s face,” spraying her with saliva.76 Finally,
in Jordan, the offensive remarks were made by someone who was
67

Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 467 F.3d 378, 378 (4th Cir. 2006) (denying
rehearing en banc)
68
FED. R. APP. P. 35.
69
Jordan, 467 F.3d 378.
70
See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. JKB-12-212, 2013 WL 1413031, at
*5 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2013), rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
71
Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379.
72
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 269– 70 (4th Cir. 2015) (en
banc).
73
Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379.
74
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270.
75
Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379.
76
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270.
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indisputably a mere coworker;77 in Boyer-Liberto, although Ms.
Clubb’s status presented a bit of a vexed question, there was clearly
sufficient evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude that
Ms. Clubb was a manager and not a mere coworker.78 All of this could
have provided abundant fodder for distinguishing Jordan and allowing
Boyer-Liberto’s case to go forward. Instead, Judge Bredar took the
position that Jordan was applicable, eschewing factual and analytical
nuances.79
B. The Fourth Circuit Case
Ms. Boyer-Liberto appealed and had sufficient cause for
optimism. In 2008, when Jordan was decided, a bare majority of the
fifteen judges sitting on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
Jordan’s petition for rehearing.80 Since then, several vacancies had
opened on the Court, which President Obama had filled with
appointees who were presumably more liberal than the outgoing
incumbents.81 Because appeals were assigned randomly to three judge
panels for decision,82 the possibility of Boyer-Liberto drawing at least
two sympathetic judges was encouraging.
In what seemed an auspicious omen, Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s case
was selected for oral argument.83 Unlike many state appellate systems,
the Federal Appeals system does not guarantee an oral argument in
every case.84 Whether to assign appeals for oral argument is left up to
77

Jordan, 467 F.3d at 379.
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 270–71.
79
Judge Bredar’s opinion was a mere four pages. See Boyer-Liberto v.
Fontainebleau Corp., No. JKB-12-212, 2013 WL 1413031 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2013),
rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
80
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 467 F.3d 332, 378 (4th Cir. 2006).
81
Anne E. Marimow, There’s a Word That No Longer Describes the Federal
Appeals Court in Richmond, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/theres-a-word-that-no-longerdescribes-the-federal-appeals-court-in-richmond/2017/04/12/3a82e0c4-193c-11e79887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?utm_term=.1d7da4c7b6da.
82
See 4TH CIR. R. 34(c) (“The Court initially hears and decides cases in panels
consisting of three judges with the Chief Judge or most senior active judge
presiding.”).
83
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
84
4TH CIR. R. 34(a).
78
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the Federal Circuits to determine and the Fourth Circuit rarely grants
arguments.85 The Fourth Circuit has the lowest incidence of oral
argument of any Federal Circuit, and the great majority of appeals in
the Fourth Circuit are decided without it.86 Thus, when Ms. BoyerLiberto’s appeal was selected for oral argument, it indicated that the
Court was taking her case seriously, and most lawyers would have
assumed that the Court was entertaining reversal of the district court
judgment.87
Whether these harbingers of success would be borne out could
not be told until the morning of oral argument, since everything
depended on which judges were assigned the panel. Their identities
are not disclosed by the Court until “check in,” the pre-hearing ritual
in which the lawyers report to the Clerk’s office, confirm which
lawyers will be arguing the case and which are merely “on the brief,”
and – most critically – are told for the first time which three judges
will hear the case.88
Oral argument in the Boyer-Liberto case was held the morning
of January 29, 2014.89 Counsel for Ms. Boyer-Liberto had made the
trip from the Eastern Shore the day before, arriving in Richmond in
the midst of a snow storm.90 But January 29th, though bitter cold,
dawned bright, sunny, and seemingly full of portent. But here, Ms.
Boyer-Liberto’s four year run of bad luck kicked in with renewed
vigor: Even though Republicans were now a minority on the Court,91
Ms. Boyer-Liberto had drawn a panel comprised exclusively of

85

ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS.,
ON THE MERITS,

U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—CASES TERMINATED

http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_b5_630.2016.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2017).
86
Id.
87
See id. (showing the low rate of accepted cases).
88
See 4TH CIR. R. 34(a) (“Because any case may be decided without oral argument,
all major arguments should be fully developed in the briefs.”).
89
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
90
NAT’L. OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ISSN 0039-1972, STORM DATA
(2014).
91
Marimow, surpa note 81.
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Republican appointed judges.92 And one of the three – in defiance of
fifteen-to-one odds – was none other than Judge Niemeyer himself.93
The other two panelists were both South Carolinians.94 One,
Judge Dennis Shedd, was a former Strom Thurmond staffer,95 who
was widely regarded as one of the Court’s staunchest conservatives.
The other, Chief Judge William Traxler, was generally considered a
“moderate” – a characterization borne out by events in this case.96
Going into oral argument that morning, it was clear Ms. BoyerLiberto’s only hope lay in persuading the panel the differences
between Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s story and the facts in Jordan were
sufficient for her case to warrant a reprieve from Jordan’s seeming
ban on “single incident” workplace harassment claims. Although oral
argument in the Fourth Circuit is often spirited, with the judges
peppering the lawyers with questions and interjections, none of the
panelists had much to say or ask about the merits of the case; the only
fireworks came in an exchange with counsel and Judge Niemeyer over
whether a party’s Answers to Interrogatories could be used to support
her own opposition to a summary judgment motion,97 a topic of mild
interest to technically minded lawyers but suitable as a general
anesthetic for just about everyone else.98 The panelists said nothing to
which counsel for either side could fasten their hopes in awaiting the

92

The panel consisted of Chief Judge Traxler, Judge Niemeyer, and Judge Shedd.
Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 350.
93
Id.
94
Judges of the Court, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
95
Judge Dennis W. Shedd, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges/ judges-of-the-court/judge-dennis-w-shedd (last
visited Nov. 16, 2017).
96
Carl Tobias, A New Chief Judge for the Fourth Circuit, WASH. POST (July 8,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-arelocal/wp/2016/07/08/a-new-chief-judge-for-the-fourthcircuit/?utm_term=.2c39184962dd.
97
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2014),
rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
98
It is not surprising Judge Niemeyer was drawn to the topic. Judge Niemeyer is a
renowned proceduralist and co-author of MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY, which,
since its publication in 1984, has held near-biblical status as the premier gloss on the
Maryland Rules. PAUL V. NIEMEYER ET AL., MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY (4th
ed. 2006).
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decision, which did not come until almost five months later, on May
13, in a published opinion.99
In the Fourth Circuit, as with most intermediate appellate
courts, the vast majority of decisions are unpublished.100 Lawyers are
discouraged from citing unreported opinions as authority for any
proposition.101 Historically, that proscription was quite real and
certainly easy to obey, since most unpublished opinions were
inaccessible, even to lawyers.102 However, with the advent of legal
research archives like WestLaw and Lexis, unreported opinions
became easy to find. That notwithstanding, published opinions still
have a totemic significance, as evidenced by Jordan, which, of course,
was a published opinion.
Thus, it was yet another Sophoclean continuation of Ms.
Boyer-Liberto’s sad story that her defeat in the Fourth Circuit came to
her through a published opinion.103 Authored by Judge Niemeyer, the
Opinion adopted Judge Bredar’s characterization of the events as
“single-incident” harassment and adopted Judge Niemeyer’s own
reasoning in Jordan to reach the conclusion that such harassment
could not as a matter of law be deemed sufficiently severe or pervasive
to be actionable.104 As he had done in Jordan, and as Judge Bredar had
done under the mantle of Jordan, Judge Niemeyer collapsed the rule
that the plaintiff in a retaliation case must merely have an objectively
reasonable belief that the subject of his or her complaint is wrongful –
not a legally accurate belief.105 In effect, Judge Niemeyer again held
that if the plaintiff gets it wrong, then the complaint could not possibly
be “objectively reasonable.”106 In short, Judge Niemeyer held that
99

Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 350.
The courts for the eleven Federal Circuits comprise the penultimate level in the
Federal Appellate process given the infrequency with which the United States
Supreme Court agrees to review cases. They are the defacto last resort for most
litigants.
101
Citations to unreported opinions is permitted by the rules, but custom discourages
their use. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
102
Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for
Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 204 (2007).
103
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
104
See Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d 350.
105
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2014),
rev’d en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
106
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 467 F.3d 332, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2006).
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neither Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s workplace harassment claim nor her
retaliation claim was tenable, and affirmed the decision of the District
Court.107
Chief Judge Traxler wrote a partial dissent.108 Cryptically, the
Chief Judge wrote he agreed that, “under existing precedent,” Ms.
Boyer-Liberto had failed to establish a hostile workplace harassment
claim.109 But the Chief Judge parted company on Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s
retaliation claim. Citing Judge King’s invocation of “Catch-22,”110 he
adopted a phrase from Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s brief, concluding “I cannot
accept that an employee in circumstances like these can be forced to
choose between her job and her dignity.”111
Perhaps the most intriguing part of the Boyer-Liberto Opinion
was Judge Shedd’s concurrence, which, virtually in its entirely, read as
follows:
I agree … that, under our precedent, as a matter of law the
facts of this case do not demonstrate a hostile work
environment. Based on this Court’s decision in Jordan v.
Alternative Resources Corp … I agree … that summary
judgment should also be affirmed on the retaliation claim.112
When the Decision was published, Judge Shedd’s concurrence seemed
to many readers inscrutable, although its real meaning became clear
enough through subsequent events.
IV.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, EN BANC

A. Oral Argument
When an appellant loses, she faces three options: the first is to
accept the outcome, the second is to petition the United States

107

Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 360.
Id. at 361–63 (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
109
Id.
110
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2014), reh’g
en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting).
111
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 763 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d
en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
112
Id. at 360–61 (Shedd, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
108
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Supreme Court for certiorari,113 and the third is to petition the Circuit
Court for rehearing en banc.114 Since the Supreme Court seldom
grants certiorari, Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s real options were acceptance or
seeking en banc review. Usually, petitioning for en banc review is
almost as much a nonstarter as trying to go to the Supreme Court. The
Fourth Circuit typically grants only two or three such petitions per
year.115 However, the fact that the Chief Judge had dissented
suggested that many of his colleagues might – if for no other reason
than out of deference – agree to give a second chance to a case in
which he had found merit. Additionally, there was Judge Shedd’s
concurrence. That one of the Court’s most conservative members had
declined to join in Judge Niemeyer’s Opinion, and instead had written
a painfully parsed concurrence, suggested he and perhaps his
conservative allies on the Court might entertain a reappraisal of the
principles upon which the case had been decided.116 Finally, students
of the Fourth Circuit claimed to detect a liberalizing trend in the
decisions of the Court since the Obama appointees had joined it in the
years following the Jordan decision.117 Given the changes in the
ideological makeup of the court,118 it just might be possible to recruit
the bare majority needed to rehear the case, and even possible to
persuade that majority either to overrule or distinguish Jordan, were
rehearing granted.
Just as in Jordan, the appellant petitioned for rehearing en
banc, and supporting amicus briefs were filed by the EEOC, the Public
Justice Center and the Metropolitan Washington Employment
Lawyers Association.119 It was at this point Ms. Boyer-Liberto got her

113

4TH CIR. R. 41.2.
4TH CIR. R. 35(a).
115
The Boyer-Liberto case was one of three en banc arguments in 2014. In 2015, the
following year, there were no en banc arguments. See En Banc Cases, UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/en-banc-cases (last visited Sep. 24, 2017).
116
See Brian S. Clarke, The Clash of Old and New Fourth Circuit Ideologies: BoyerLiberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. and the Moderation of the Fourth Circuit, 66 S.C. L.
Rev. 927 (providing context as to the shifting political ideology of the Fourth
Circuit).
117
See Marimow, supra note 81.
118
Id.
119
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2015) (en
banc).
114
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first break: On July 1, 2014, the Court granted her petition, and agreed
to rehear the case en banc.120
The underlying logic of en banc review is that the panel
decision is vacated, and the entire Court reviews the original decision
of the District Court.121 There are no new briefs, but there is a brand
new oral argument before all fifteen judges of the Circuit. In theory,
during oral argument the lawyers are to address themselves, not to the
panel decision, but to the merits and demerits of the District Court
decision,122 and the judges are to adopt the same approach. In practice,
it is difficult if not impossible to avoid discussion of the panel
decision, because the three panelists are among the fifteen judges
rehearing the case, and thus are physically present and typically quite
active during the rehearing.
En banc oral arguments are held in the courthouse’s
ceremonial courtroom.123 The courthouse itself is a massive
antebellum structure which served during the Civil War as the office
of Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Most of the courtrooms
have been “modernized,” and look much like their counterparts all
over the country, but the ceremonial courtroom is an exception, set up
like a 19th Century courtroom, full of dark wood and plush carpets.
At the en banc hearing, the fifteen judges are ranged in a ushaped, three-sided phalanx in the front of the courtroom. There is a
podium in the middle of the room for use by the lawyers, with the
usual rows of pews behind. Perhaps because of the room’s very high
ceilings, it is difficult for the lawyer standing at the podium to tell
which judge is currently speaking: The sound seems to ricochet around
the room, so that the voice of a judge on the left seems to be coming
from his counterpart on the right. Some of the judges deal with the
problem by waving their hands when they speak, but most just let the
lawyers try to figure it out.

Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d en
banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
121
4TH CIR. R. 35(c).
122
Id. (“[G]ranting of rehearing en banc vacates the previous panel judgment and
opinion; the rehearing is a review of the judgment or decision from which review is
sought and not a review of the judgment of the panel.”).
123
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. U.S. Courthouse, Richmond, VA, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, https://www.gsa.gov/historic-buildings/lewis-f-powell-jr-uscourthouse-richmond-va (last visited Nov. 7, 2017).
120
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Unlike most courtroom proceedings, which typically draw a
handful of onlookers, en banc rehearings often attract a standing room
only crowd of law students, professors, lawyers, and reporters. Those
who cannot make the trip to Richmond can listen to a live feed of the
oral argument.124 The recordings are archived on the court’s website,
so interested parties who are tied up at the time of oral argument can
listen at their convenience.125
Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s rehearing oral argument was held the
morning of September 18, 2014, four years to the day after she had sat
in the office of the Clarion’s General Manager and presented her
complaint.126 Presiding was Chief Judge Traxler, who had written the
panel decision’s dissent. Although appellate arguments are usually
subject to rigorous time constraints – fifteen minutes for the Appellant,
twenty minutes for the Appellee, then five minutes more for the
Appellant127 – no such restrictions apply to en banc rehearings,128 and
this one went on for almost two hours, in part because the court had
allowed additional time for one of the amici, the EEOC, to participate.
Fourteen of the fifteen judges actively took part, engaging all three
lawyers with questions and colloquies: The sole exception was Judge
Niemeyer, who sat silently throughout.129
Ms. Boyer-Liberto, who attended in person, also sat silently
throughout. To her, it must have seemed her luck was finally turning.
From the comments and questions of the judges, it seemed clear most
felt her complaint should have been protected against retaliation. What
was not clear was whether the judges would overrule or merely
distinguish Jordan. Even less clear was the interesting question of
whether the judges would hold she could actually sue her employer for
workplace harassment, or merely complain about it. In other words, it
seemed clear her retaliation claim was likely to be revived, but far
from clear whether the court would go on to hold that the two
124

Listen to Oral Arguments, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments (last visited
Sep. 24, 2017).
125
Id.
126
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
127
4TH CIR. R. 34(d).
128
4TH CIR. R. 35 (including no time restrictions for arguments).
129
Oral Argument: Reya Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/13-1473-20140918.mp3.
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outbursts of racist invective attributed to Ms. Clubb were sufficient to
constitute actionable workplace harassment.
B. Historical Developments in Workplace Civil Rights
To appreciate fully this “moment” of suspense – which lasted
seven months, until the issuance of the court’s Opinion May 7, 2015130
– it is necessary to retrace the evolution of workplace civil rights
protections over the last half-century. In 1964, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act, whose workplace protections were codified in Title
VII of the Act, and hence became known in the legal profession
simply as “Title VII.”131 Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”132 To ensure not only that the Act had teeth but that
there was someone to do the chewing, Congress simultaneously
established the EEOC and empowered the agency to entertain
complaints of violations and to undertake enforcement of the law.133
The EEOC began promulgating regulations to flesh out the barebones
protections afforded by Title VII.134 In adopting regulations
effectuating discrimination based on sex, the EEOC decided it was not
enough simply to prohibit personnel actions which showed favoritism
to men.135 The EEOC went further, acknowledging the reality that
women were often subjected to sexual conditions of employment to
which men were immune.136 Accordingly, the EEOC regulations
prohibited quid pro quo sexual harassment, by which submission to
130

Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
Milestones: 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/50th/milestones/1964.cfm (last visited Sep. 24,
2017).
132
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2 (a)(1) (2016).
133
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-4 (2016).
134
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (“[I]n 1980 the EEOC
issued Guidelines specifying that ‘sexual harassment,’ as there defined, is a form of
sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.”).
135
U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, N-915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON
EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (Jan. 12, 1990),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (describing when sexual
favoritism may become sexual harassment).
136
Id.
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sexual advances was made a condition of employment.137 But the
EEOC went still further. Focusing on the statute’s “terms [and]
conditions … of employment” language, the EEOC regulations also
proscribed what came to be known as “hostile environment” sexual
harassment, reasoning it was a form of discrimination based on sex to
require employees to work in an environment that had become
permeated by offensive sexual themes, images, language and/or
conduct.138
For a while, it was unclear whether the courts would support
the EEOC’s expansion of Title VII to include prohibition of workplace
sexual harassment. But, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the
uncertainties were dispelled, as the Supreme Court ruled that both
types of sexual harassment violated Title VII.139 In holding that the
Plaintiff had (arguably) framed a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, cautioned that, in order to be actionable, workplace
harassment “must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive
working environment.’”140
Courts applying Chief Justice Rehnquist’s formulation of the
workplace harassment doctrine received additional guidance in 1998,
in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.141 There, Justice Souter wrote that
a “recurring point in these [harassment] opinions is that ‘simple
teasing’ . . . off-hand comments, and isolated incidents, (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the
‘terms and conditions of employment.’”142 As in Jordan, some courts
focused exclusively on the “pervasive” prong of the “severe or
pervasive” test established by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and interpreted
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Id.
Id.
139
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
140
Id. at 67 (citations omitted). During the course of an eleven-day trial, Ms. Vinson
testified that her supervisor “fondled her in front of other employees, followed her
into the women’s restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and
even forcibly raped her on several occasions.” Id. at 60.
141
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (citations omitted).
142
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citations omitted).
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Justice Souter’s remarks to hold that “isolated incidents” could never
constitute actionable harassment.143
Meanwhile, the trail blazed by the EEOC widened to embrace
racial harassment, disability harassment and ageist harassment. 144 As
the doctrine of workplace harassment expanded, it became clear the
courts and the EEOC would interpret Title VII to prohibit any
workplace environment that had become hostile or abusive based on
any of the suspect classifications outlined in Title VII or in any of the
statutes that followed its lead – the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA),145 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, (PDA)146 and the Age
Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA).147 As the doctrine of
workplace harassment expanded, however, its application was
simultaneously limited by courts who interpreted Meritor148 and
Faragher149 to apply only to harassment which through repetition had
become “pervasive.”150 For these courts, the critical “or” dropped out
of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s formulation. For them, the standard was
not “severe or pervasive,” but rather “severe and pervasive.”151
A full understanding of the dynamic tension underlying the
Boyer-Liberto case also requires a brief review of the doctrine of
workplace retaliation. Title VII forbids discrimination against an
employee “because he [or she] has opposed any practice made . . .
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g
en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006). See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB, 477
U.S. at 67; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Thus, the Fourth Circuit ignored Justice
Souter’s exception for “isolated incidents” that were “extremely serious.” Id.
144
The Law, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/50th/thelaw.cfm (last visited Aug. 26, 2017).
145
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101– 12213 (2016) (prohibiting the disparate treatment of
individuals on the basis of disability). Title I of the Americans with Disability Act
addresses discrimination in employment. Id. at §§ 12111–12117.
146
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2016) (prohibiting disparate treatment of individuals on the
basis of sex, including if the individual is pregnant).
147
U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2016) (protecting those over age 40 from employment
discrimination).
148
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
149
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
150
See, e.g., Singleton v. Dep’t of Correctional Educ., 115 F. App’x 119, 122 (4th
Cir. 2004) (“The conduct that she complains of, though boorish and offensive, is
more comparable to the kind of rude behavior, teasing, and offhand comments that
we have held are not sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute actionable sexual
harassment.”).
151
Id.
143
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unlawful” by Title VII.152 In plain English, an employee cannot be
retaliated against because he or she complained of workplace
discrimination. In order to establish a workplace retaliation claim
under Title VII, an employee must prove “(1) that she engaged in a
protected activity; (2) that her employer took an adverse employment
action against her; and (3) that there was a causal link between the two
events.”153 To be protected, a complaint need not be accurate or wellfounded.154 It need only be based upon a reasonable belief that the
conduct violates Title VII.155 Or, as the Fourth Circuit itself put it, in a
2005 case, Title VII protects not only “employment actions actually
unlawful under Title VII but also employment actions an employee
reasonably believes to be unlawful.”156 But here, too, there was a
countervailing limitation: As evidenced by Jordan157 and the panel
decision in Boyer-Liberto,158 some courts took the position that if the
complainant got it wrong, and the conduct about which she
complained was not actually unlawful, then, ipso facto, no one could
reasonably believe it was unlawful.
It was at the convergence of these two threads of developing
jurisprudence that the Boyer-Liberto case arose. If, as some courts had
held, workplace harassment was not actionable until it had fully
ripened through a series of recurrent incidents, and if, as some courts
had (in effect) held, a workplace complaint was only protected if it
targeted fully ripened misconduct, then someone like Ms. BoyerLiberto would have to put up with the offensive mistreatment until it
became “pervasive.”159 But, if she did, as Judge King and Chief Judge

152

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2016).
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405–
06 (4th Cir. 2005).
154
Id. at 407.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 406.
157
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 340–41 (4th Cir. 2006)
reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).
158
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 359 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d
en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
159
Id. at 358 (“Liberto has not pointed to any Fourth Circuit case, nor could she,
finding the presence of a hostile work environment based on a single incident.”); see
also Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341 (noting that, based on the plaintiff’s observations, the
plaintiff must reasonably believe the “violation is actually occurring.”).
153
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Traxler had warned in their dissents,160 she ran the risk of seeing her
complaint dismissed under long-standing Supreme Court precedent to
the effect that early complaints were to be encouraged, for the sake of
prevention, and tardy claims were to be dismissed.161 In effect, the
Supreme Court had fashioned a constitutional version of the equity
doctrine of laches, by which someone who “sleeps on his rights”
forfeits them through inaction.162 And that, of course, created the
“Catch-22” against which both judges cautioned: If you complain in
time to prevent misconduct from developing into full blown
harassment, your complaint is unprotected because it is premature;
but, if you defer complaining until the acts of harassment have become
sufficiently “pervasive” to frame actionable harassment, then your
complaint will be dismissed because it is tardy.
While legal scholars wondered how these legal doctrines
would align in the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision,163 astrologers
might well have wondered at the alignment of the stars, for it is as an
interesting coincidence that the Jordan decision,164 the original BoyerLiberto panel decision165 and the Boyer-Liberto en banc166 decision
160

Boyer-Liberto, 752 F.3d at 363 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (noting that employees
experiencing discrimination can either report misconduct and be fired or remain in a
hostile environment); Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341, 349 (King, J., dissenting) (stating that
the majority’s ruling has placed “employees who experience racially discriminatory
conduct in a classic ‘Catch–22’”).
161
Known as the “Ellerth/Faragher defense,” employees are required to report
misconduct in a timely manner in order to prevent hostile environments from
developing, or risk dismissal of future claims. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998) (stating that failing to report discrimination through the
employer’s preventative system could result in the plaintiff not recovering damages
for any preventable discrimination suffered); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (noting that an affirmative defense to an
employer’s vicarious liability has two elements: “(a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.”).
162
Laches, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See cases cited supra note
161.
163
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 268 (4th Cir. 2015) (en
banc).
164
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.) reh’g en banc
denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006)
165
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 752 F.3d 350, 763 (4th Cir. 2014), rev’d
en banc, 786 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 2015).
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were all issued under the sign of Taurus the bull; Jordan having been
handed down May 12, 2006, the first Boyer-Liberto decision May 13,
2014 and the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision May 7, 2015.167 And, in
a dramatic turn around, the majority opinion was written by Judge
King, who had authored the Jordan dissent.168
V.

THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING

Not surprisingly, Judge King’s Opinion, written on behalf of a
dozen judges, partakes a bit of a victory lap. Although acknowledging
that Jordan could easily be distinguished from the facts in BoyerLiberto, Judge King and his colleagues held that Jordan was overruled
to the extent it conflicted with their rulings in Boyer-Liberto.169 In a
closely reasoned, fourteen page decision, the majority cited Justice
Souter’s language in Faragher170 for the proposition that an “isolated
incident” could suffice to create an actionable hostile work
environment “if extremely serious.”171 Observing that comparisons to
lesser primates (apes, monkeys, gorillas)172 were singularly repugnant
forms of racist invective, comparable to use of the n-word, and noting
that the attacks on Boyer-Liberto were accompanied by a degree of
physicality and by the evident ability to effectuate them, the majority
held that Boyer-Liberto had alleged facts sufficient to take her hostile
work environment claim beyond summary judgment, to final
resolution by the jury.173 But, the majority cautioned, even if the two
racist tirades were insufficient to frame a cause of action for hostile
workplace harassment, it was still objectively reasonable for BoyerLiberto to regard them as unlawful and hence for her complaint to be
166

Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d. at 285.
See supra notes 163–66
168
Jordan, 458 F.3d at 349 (King, J., dissenting); Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 268.
169
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 269.
170
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
171
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 285–86.
172
The majority in the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision point out the especially
odious nature of the insult “porch monkey.” Id. at 280. The Court places the
remark within the historical context that “[p]rimate rhetoric has been used to
intimidate African–Americans’ and that ‘[t]he use of the term “monkey” and other
similar words,’ including the variation “porch monkey,” has ‘been part of
actionable racial harassment claims across the country.’” Id. at 280 (citing Green
v. Franklin Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2006)).
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protected against retaliation.174 The majority resolved the “Catch-22”
previously identified by Judge King and Chief Judge Traxler in favor
of preventive maintenance.175 The victim of workplace invective need
not wait until it had assumed the dimensions of full blown harassment,
nor – as suggested by Judge Niemeyer in Jordan – did she have to
establish that a “plan was afoot” to do so, but could instead complain
of her mistreatment with impunity, at least where the invective was
“physically threatening or humiliating.”176 Interestingly, and
presumably because the majority explicitly overruled Jordan, Judge
Shedd joined in the majority opinion.177
Judge Niemeyer, of course, dissented.178 Judge Niemeyer pointed
out it was unnecessary to overrule Jordan to justify the outcome
reached by the majority.179 The outcome was itself insupportable, in
his view, because the very nature of a claim based on the creation of a
hostile work environment depends upon the pollution of that
environment through repetition.180 Since the two episodes of racist
invective in Boyer-Liberto arose from the same incident, they could
not support a claim for hostile workplace harassment.181 And, absent
some evidence the harassment was likely to recur, they could not form
the basis for a protected complaint, because it was not objectively
reasonable to believe that an actionable hostile environment was
evolving:
While Liberto had every right to be offended by Clubb’s use of a
racial epithet and acted reasonably and responsibly in reporting the
incident . . . she lacked a reasonable belief . . . that she was
opposing her employer’s commission of ‘a[ ] practice made . . .
unlawful . . . by [Title VII]’ . . . [f]or that reason … as a matter of
law . . . she did not engage in protective activity . . .182
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Id. at 285.
Id. at 284.
176
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 284. But see Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,
458 F.3d 332, 340 (4th Cir.) reh’g en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006).
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Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 268.
178
Id. at 293 (Neimeyer, J., dissenting).
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Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 303 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 294–95.
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Id. at 303.
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Id. at 305.
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In other words, Ms. Boyer-Liberto had every right to complain about
her mistreatment, and her boss had every right to fire her.
Between the majority’s fourteen pages and the dissent’s thirteen,
were nestled a little more than three pages authored by Judge
Wilkinson, joined by Judge Agee.183 Literally and analytically, they
occupied the middle ground. Although acknowledging “that a good
workplace environment is poisoned by the kind of remarks alleged
here is an understatement,” Judge Wilkinson found Ms. Clubb’s two
outbursts insufficient to impute liability to her employer for the
creation of a hostile workplace environment.184 However, Judge
Wilkinson went on to conclude that “Liberto’s belief that a hostile
work environment existed or was coming into existence was
objectively reasonable,” and hence he joined in the majority’s
conclusion that Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s retaliation claim should have
survived summary judgment.185 Although Judge Wilkinson did agree
that, “under the circumstances presented here,” complaining about the
harassment was “objectively reasonable” and hence protected, he
chided the majority for their insensitivity to “the dangers of overreporting,” which, in his view, “drifts every so casually toward
draconian consequences for mere utterance and speech.”186 If, Judge
Wilkinson warned, courts became overzealous in taxing employers for
reckless statements by workers that offend co-workers, then the
workplace would become polarized along lines drawn by race and
gender, with employees afraid to speak to each other freely or at all;
moreover, employers would be driven “into the role of censors,” all at
the cost of free speech.187
VI.

183

THE FUTURE OF WORKPLACE HARASSMENT CLAIMS

Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 288 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkinson, a
former Chief Judge of the circuit, has elsewhere expounded the view that a
proliferation of civil rights litigation has engendered the suppression of free speech
and also, perversely, worsened race relations. See, J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, ONE
NATION INDIVISIBLE: HOW ETHNIC SEPARATISM THREATENS AMERICA (1997).
184
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 288–90 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
185
Id. at 290.
186
Id. at 290–92.
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Id. at 289.

Cockey and Hay

2018]

WORKPLACE HARASSMENT

237

Following the en banc decision, Ms. Boyer- Liberto’s case was
returned to District Court in Baltimore.188 Judge Bredar referred the
parties to a settlement conference, which quickly led to a resolution of
the case.189 Ms. Boyer-Liberto has moved on, but the remarkable final
act of her five-year courtroom drama changed the law of the land. It is
clear the en banc decision in Boyer-Liberto190 has displaced Jordan191
as the touchstone for workplace harassment and retaliation claims, but
what does that portend? Certainly, it provides greater security for
workers unwilling to tolerate workplace racism and little detriment to
workplace comradery and freedom of aggression.
A. While Judge Niemeyer’s Dissent May Appear to Present a
Workable Solution to the Unique Challenges of Workplace
Harassment, it is Untenable in Practice and the Majority
was Correct to Reject it.
Given that Judge Niemeyer was the only dissenting voice out
of fifteen judges, it seems unlikely his views will be adopted by any
three-judge panel of the court.192 But, as evidenced by the fact the
Jordan dissent193 eventually became the majority view adopted by
twelve out of fifteen judges, it is unwise to ignore a cogently argued
dissent. Looking first at Judge Niemeyer’s rejection of Ms. BoyerLiberto’s hostile work environment claim, one notes with interest it
devolves – like the majority opinion – from an interpretation of Justice
Souter’s pronouncement that “isolated incidents, (unless extremely
serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and
conditions of employment.”194

188

Id.at 288 (majority opinion).
The substance of that resolution is confidential. If the case had continued
another six weeks, it would have been five years since the incident that sparked the
lawsuit.
190
Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 268–69.
191
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2006) reh’g
en banc denied, 467 F.3d 378 (4th Cir. 2006)
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Unless, of course, fate joins him with Judges Wilkinson and Agee, which might
augur bad news for a plaintiff complaining of workplace harassment.
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Jordan, 458 F.3d at 349 (King, J., dissenting).
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Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); Boyer-Liberto v.
Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 294 (4th Cir. 2015) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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Judge Niemeyer points out that Justice Souter referred to
“isolated incidents,” in the plural, from which he infers that a hostile
workplace environment will only arise through the repetition of
multiple “isolated incidents.”195 But that inference, as they say, gets
him “into the weeds,” because, by definition, an isolated incident is
isolated. If something happens and then is repeated, it makes no sense
to refer to it as an “isolated incident,” because the fact that it is
repeated suggests it is in no way “isolated.”196 Upon reflection, it
seems safer to assume, as the majority evidently did, that what Judge
Souter meant was that “an isolated incident, (unless extremely serious)
will not amount to a discriminatory change in the terms and conditions
of employment.”197 Semantic niceties aside, Judge Niemeyer seems to
have given short shrift to the genesis of the workplace harassment
doctrine, which lay in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s holding that the
EEOC was right to proscribe workplace harassment that was
“sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the
victim’s] employment.”198 Certainly, the Chief Justice’s holding
allowed abundantly for the possibility that a single horrific event
might “be sufficiently severe” to “create an abusive working
environment.”199
Turning to Judge Niemeyer’s handling of the retaliation claim,
it appears he suggests a new and promising standard. If the harassment
about which the plaintiff complains seems “likely to recur,” then it is
objectively reasonable to complain about it and the complaint will be
protected.200 On its face, the “likely to recur” standard presents an
ingenious solution to the early reporting dilemma. If an outburst of
racist invective seems just that – an extemporaneous outburst, unlikely
to be repeated – then reporting it to upper management might arguably
be seen as an overreaction and therefore unprotected; conversely, if
the perpetrator seems to be acting upon some plan or design, or
otherwise appears to be the sort of person for whom the use of racial
epithets might be habitual, then reporting it immediately seems a
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Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 294 (discussing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788).
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
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Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 285–86.
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Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (emphasis added)
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defensible precaution and therefore entitled to legal protection.201
However, it is difficult to imagine what would earmark an act of
harassment as “likely to recur.” Oddly, the one thing that would seem
to qualify would be the fact that it does recur, as in Boyer-Liberto. In
Ms. Boyer-Liberto’s case, the perpetrator allegedly subjected her to a
racial epithet, and then, the very next day, targeted her again with
precisely the same racial epithet.202 Given that the harassment in this
case did recur, it seems plausible to suppose it likely will recur again,
but yet Judge Niemeyer – the would-be creator of the “likely to recur”
standard – would have none of it.203 All this suggests that the “likely to
recur” standard is unworkably nebulous, and the majority was wise not
to adopt it.
B. While Judge Wilkinson’s Concurrence Presents Persuasive
Concerns Surrounding Freedom of Speech in the
Workplace, those Concerns are Outweighed by the Benefits
of the Majority Approach
The concurrence by Judge Wilkinson sounds warnings that
seem prescient and are expressed with an eloquence that undoubtedly
will win supporters.204 Heightening the responsibility of employers for
the hurtful words of their employees will likely make employers and
employees more vigilant in self-policing – perhaps at the expense of
candor or even at the expense of wholesome debate.205 Making racist
and sexist language risky may well induce cautious employees to stay
away from co-workers of a different race or of the opposite gender.

201

See Amy Gallow, How to Respond to an Offensive Comment at Work, HARV. BUS
REV. (Feb. 8, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/how-to-respond-to-an-offensivecomment-at-work (“There’s no denying that this is a tough situation. Joan Williams,
founding director of the Center for WorkLife Law at UC Hastings College of the
Law, says that these decisions are particularly risky because they involve “two of the
most corrosive elements of bias in the workplace:” the uncertainty that whether what
you heard is bias and the fear that you might be penalized for how you handle it. It’s
normal to question ourselves in these situations, wondering whether we heard the
person right or if it was just a joke.).
202
Id. at 270 (majority opinion).
203
Id. at 304–05 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
204
See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 288–93 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
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Id. at 289.
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Depending upon one’s ideology, this may not turn out to be “a good
thing.” But this case does not truly present any of these dangers.
Prohibiting the use of racial epithets should not inhibit the free
speech of anyone, and, to the extent there was any debate or discourse
in this case, it concerned neither politics nor religion nor the
expression of any ideas at all, but rather, the advisability of cutting
through the kitchen.206 So, while Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence holds
interest to those who ponder the advisability of civil rights litigation
and civil rights laws, it has little direct relevance to the
“circumstances” of this case (as he acknowledges), and, frankly, it is
hard to envision a case upon which it would have a decisive bearing.
Perhaps the real problem, in Judge Wilkinson’s view – which
he makes implicit here but has made explicit elsewhere207 – is that
prohibiting even overtly racist invective arguably subverts racial unity
by imposing race-based restrictions upon speech.208 The underlying
premise is that the law should be truly colorblind and race–based
government measures designed to assist minorities, such as affirmative
action, ethnic quotas and, as in this case, protection against racist
abuse, should be prohibited.209 It is an application of the old
playground monitor conundrum. If the teacher intervenes to protect the
bespectacled, violin-toting waif who is being bullied, there is always
the risk that her well-intended intervention will backfire, resulting
either in drawing more abuse upon the victim when her back is turned,
or result in the victim becoming utterly shunned and isolated. And it is
certainly true that intervening to protect individuals and groups who
would otherwise be oppressed inevitably calls attention to their
separateness and engenders resentment from those who would prefer
there be no intervention.210 But without the intervention, what will
there be but a continuation of the status quo?
Hoping that white supremacists will somehow come to
embrace cultural diversity on their own is as realistic as expecting that
a playground gang will somehow develop an appreciation for classical
206

Id. at 269.
See J. HARVEY WILKINSON, III, ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE: HOW ETHNIC
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including how affirmative action contributes to that divide).
208
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music and the fashion potential of well-styled eyewear. It seems sad
that a country founded upon broad principles of equality for all men,
and upon tolerance of all ideas and creeds, should now require special
civil rights laws and a legion of civil rights lawyers, to ensure that
those principles find practical expression in the workplace, but such is
the case. Our civil rights laws are not without their deleterious side
effects, but like any strong medicine, they are worth it. If we are not
willing to concede the field to the bullies of this world, then we must
be willing to act forcefully to tax speech that is not merely
disrespectful, that is not merely frank or impetuous, but which would
actually deny its targets the fundamental human dignity our laws
guarantee them.

C. The Majority Presents an Appropriate Solution to a
Complex Problem, Eliminating the Catch-22 of Jordan and
Creating a Workable Standard for Courts to Apply in the
Future
In assessing the durability of the majority opinion, the clear
starting point is the fact that half of the opinion – resuscitating Ms.
Boyer-Liberto’s retaliation claim – enjoyed the support of fourteen out
of fifteen judges, and the other half – resuscitating her workplace
harassment claim – enjoyed the support of twelve. But to that must be
added the observation that the opinion just makes sense. It is illogical
to expect employees to put up with racist invective in the workplace,
and counterproductive to put them at risk for reporting it before it gets
worse.211 Moreover, if it takes a horde of lawyers, judges, and EEOC
bureaucrats five years to figure out whether calling somebody a “porch
monkey” more than once constitutes actionable workplace harassment,
how can we expect a layperson to risk her job in a gamble on getting it
right?
Providentially, the majority opinion restored the “objectively
reasonable” rule, which had gotten only lip service in Jordan and in
211

Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp, 786 F.3d 264, 288 (4th Cir. 2015) (en
banc) (majority opinion).
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the original Boyer-Liberto panel decision.212 And, wisely, the majority
opinion resolved the harassment-reporting Catch-22 in favor of early,
preventive reporting.213 Judge Niemeyer was technically correct in
observing that, having effectively distinguished Jordan, the majority
did not need to overrule it. However, overruling it was nonetheless
right. Just as, at common law, where every dog got one “free bite,” 214
Jordan effectively enshrined the “free bite” rule for workplace
harassment and that simply cannot be good law. Moreover, Jordan
stood for the untenable proposition that for a complaint of workplace
misconduct to be protected the layperson making it had to get it
right.215 Ultimately, whether the complaint was protected because the
complainer “got it right” depended on variables such as whether Judge
Niemeyer or Judge King got the case, with the result that workers truly
did have to choose between their dignity and their job.216 Finally,
Jordan created a lose-lose dilemma for abused employees, who had to
choose between losing their job through premature complaints or
losing their lawsuit through tardy complaints.217 Jordan was bad law
and its passing should not be mourned.
Judge Niemeyer’s dissent gets it wrong because his workplace
harassment analysis depends on an unmanageable “likely to recur”
standard, and his retaliation analysis depends on discarding the
“objectively reasonable” standard in favor of protecting only
complaints that are well-founded, as determined by neoconservative
legal tenets. Judge Wilkinson’s concurrence is overly concerned with
open debate and racial unity, neither of which truly depend upon the
use of racist invective at work. Judge King’s majority opinion is
correct and should endure because it slays all the dragons. It puts the
“or” back in “severe or pervasive,” it restores the “objectively
reasonable” standard, it resolves the reporting Catch-22 in favor of
early reporting, and it eliminates the “first bite” defense for workplace
harassers.
Of course, we are still left with a somewhat uncharted border
between offensive, “stray” remarks which do not alter the terms or
212
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conditions of employment, and offensive remarks which do.
Ironically, it often is impossible for an employee to tell which is which
until she reports. If the employer responds appropriately, then the
episode may be written off as merely the rudeness of a co-worker; but
if, conversely, the complainant gets fired, then the terms or conditions
of employment have been altered, because they now apparently
include submission to racist invective. By encouraging early reporting,
the Boyer-Liberto en banc decision makes it easier for employees to
get to the truth and to survive the trip. That is good law.
In the two years that have followed the Boyer-Liberto en banc
decision, that decision has been cited multiple times in opinions
dispersed throughout the country.218 Most, however, have cited the
case simply as an affirmation of long-standing principles governing
the law of workplace harassment and retaliation.219 A significant
exception was a decision by Judge Bredar himself, who invoked the
decision to afford protection to a woman who complained of sexual
harassment based upon a single incident which, prior to Boyer-Liberto,
most courts would not have regarded as sufficient to support a claim of
hostile environment sexual harassment. 220
The case also engendered numerous commentaries in the popular
press and in blogs and webpage op-ed pieces by the employment
bar.221 Perhaps not unsurprisingly, the case was sensationalized by
reporters and vilified by management-side employment lawyers as
standing for the proposition that a single incident of “insensitive”
remarks would suffice to support federal civil rights claims.222 This
218
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approach was adopted by a review article on the case, by a Boston
College law student who echoed Judge Wilkinson’s warning that the
majority opinion blurred the line between mere insensitivity and abuse
in a manner which, perversely, would actually hamper race
relations.223 On the other hand, a widely-disseminated commentary by
Robert Fitzpatrick, a prominent plaintiff’s employment lawyer, praised
the decision for overturning Jordan and touted it as a harbinger of
liberal trends in federal employment law.224 This view was adopted by
South Carolina law professor Brian S. Clarke, who cited the case as a
stand out illustration of how the Fourth Circuit, once regarded as the
most conservative federal judiciary in America, had drifted far to the
left.225
Amidst the debate, perhaps it is wise to cling to a few facts. First,
calling an African-American a “porch monkey” is not merely rude or
“insensitive.” As the Court noted, likening someone to a jungle animal
is grossly offensive, and likening African-Americans to jungle animals
carries with it considerable historical baggage.226 Moreover, while use
of racist invective by a manager or even a co-worker is obnoxious, it is
particularly so where, as in the Boyer-Liberto case, it became clear
that it could be done with impunity and with the acquiescence of upper
management.227 Third, in Boyer-Liberto, Plaintiff had to endure the
friendly-standard-title-vii-retaliation-claims (“Although it is unlikely that this
decision will cause a stampede to the courthouse, employees (or their counsel) may
raise claims of retaliation in their discrimination complaints more often than they
might have previously. This relaxed standard means that arguments that offensive,
yet isolated, conduct is neither severe nor pervasive enough to establish
discrimination are no longer as strong. It also brings a higher likelihood that
retaliation claims will survive summary judgment and, therefore, proceed to trial
(and a jury)”).
223
See Sean Ahern, Note, Waving Goodbye to Your Rights: Retaliation and
Invalidity in the Context of Waivers Under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, 97
B.U. L. REV. 659, 676 (2017).
224
See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Fourth Circuit Overturns Decade of Precedent in
Blockbuster En Banc Hostile Work Environment Decision, FITZPATRICK ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW (May 15, 2015, 7:40 PM),
http://robertfitzpatrick.blogspot.com/2015/05/
225
Brian S. Clarke, The Clash of Old and New Fourth Circuit Ideologies: BoyerLiberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. and the Moderation of the Fourth Circuit, 66 SOUTH
CAROLINA L. REV. 940 (2015).
226
See supra note 22.
227
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 270–71 (4th Cir. 2015) (en
banc).
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same racial slur not once but twice, a sequence of events which could
be characterized as “isolated” only by splitting quite a few semantic
and logical hairs.228 Thus, at least on its actual facts, the opinion in
Boyer-Liberto did not take the Court particularly close to the
worrisome border between workplace invective that is merely
insensitive and workplace invective that constitutes intolerable racial
abuse.
These distinguishing factors, moreover, should provide a roadmap
for those who wish to carry forward the principles laid down in the
Boyer-Liberto decision. It is reasonable to expect the courts will
observe the distinction between invective that is based upon a suspect
classification, (“n-gger,” “kike,” “geezer,” and perhaps “faggot” and
“dyke”), and invective that is merely rude (“jerk,” “knucklehead,”
etc.). The first is socially and legally unacceptable,229 while the latter
is merely socially unacceptable. Moreover, even overtly racist
invective uttered randomly by a co-worker or even a manager is less
obnoxious to our constitutional values than is workplace invective that
enjoys the complicity or tacit approval of upper management.230
Lastly, even a paragon of political correctness might be capable of an
angry outburst that goes beyond mere discourtesy, and even a paragon
might top off such an outburst with a dose of racist, sexist, or ageist
invective. If, for example, Ms. Clubb had called Ms. Boyer-Liberto a
porch monkey and then apologized the next day, the case probably
never would have gotten to court and if it had it probably would have
been dismissed under the “stray remarks” doctrine.231 Repetition
necessarily implies premeditation, making the perpetrator’s course of
conduct actionable.
If, indeed, a worker’s self-expression will be “chilled” by a
workplace ban on racist invective, then that is probably a good thing.
If, moreover, a worker truly feels the only way he can avoid racially
abusing co-workers is to stay away from them, then that is probably a
good thing. If there is a bottom line, it is that zero tolerance for racist
228
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conduct and language in the workplace, even if zealously enforced by
the courts, should impair no one in the performance of their job duties,
the expression of their opinions, or their choice of who to sit next to in
the lunch room.
CONCLUSION
There is an old saying that making law is like making sausage: not
for the squeamish. But that is a saying about legislation, which, in our
country, is only half the story of how laws are made. The other half is
the refinement of law through litigation, which could more aptly be
likened to a bingo game, since it is driven by seemingly random
events. This tale never would have been told, and the hard work that
made it known people need not choose between their jobs and their
dignity, never would have been done, if the nameless barfly who
started it all had just ordered a Bud Light. The law is a mighty
machine, but its cogs and pistons turn on tiny hinges.

